The infinite horizon risk-sensitive discounted-cost and ergodic-cost nonzero-sum stochastic games for controlled Markov chains with countably many states are analyzed. For the discounted-cost game, we prove the existence of Nash equilibrium strategies in the class of Markov strategies under fairly general conditions. Under an additional geometric ergodicity condition and a small cost criterion, the existence of Nash equilibrium strategies in the class of stationary Markov strategies is proved for the ergodic-cost game.
Introduction
We study risk-sensitive nonzero-sum stochastic games on the infinite time horizon on a countable state space. Risk-sensitive cost criterion plays an important role in many applications including mathematical finance (see, e.g., Bilelecki and Pliska [8] , Nagai [32] ). In this criterion one investigates 'exponential of integral' cost which takes into account the attitude of the controller with respect to risk. The study of this kind of cost criteria was first initiated by Bellman [6] , p. 329 for the finite-state space case. Howard and Matheson [26] did an in-depth analysis for the first time in the finite-state space case where each controlled chain is irreducible and aperiodic. Rothblum [33] extended it to the general non-irreducible finite-state space case.
In the past two decades, there has been a renewed interest in this type of cost criteria as, when the 'risk factor' is strictly positive, i.e., in the risk-averse case, the use of the exponential reduces the possibility of rare but devastating large excursions of the state process. Though this criterion has been studied extensively in the literature of Markov decision processes (see, e.g., Borkar and Meyn [13] , Cavazos-Cadena and Fernandez-Gaucherand [14] , Di Masi and Stettner [15, 16, 17 ], Fleming and Hernández-Hernández [21] , Fleming and McEneaney [22] , Hernández-Hernández and 2
Article submitted to Mathematics of Operations Research; manuscript no. MOR-2015-241 Marcus [24] , Whittle [35, 36] ), the corresponding results on stochastic games seem to be limited (see e.g., Basar [3] , El-Karoui and Hamadene [18] , Jacobson [27] , James et. al. [28] , and, Klompstra [30] ). The general Linear-Exponential-Gaussian (LEG) control problem for discrete time with perfect state observation is treated in Jacobson [27] where an equivalence of this with deterministic zero-sum quadratic-cost games was shown. Whereas this paper addresses the undiscounted case, the corresponding discounted case was addressed by Hansen and Sargent [23] . This was further extended to studying the Nash equilibrium for a two-person discrete-time nonzero-sum game with quadratic-exponential cost criteria in Klompstra [30] , the analogue of the Linear-ExponentialQuadratic-Gaussian (LEQG) control problem studied in Whittle [34, 35] . The papers of Basar [3] and El-Karoui et. al. [18] deal with stochastic differential games on the finite time horizon. In James et. al. [28] , the finite-horizon risk-sensitive stochastic optimal control problem for discrete-time nonlinear systems was studied and its relation to a deterministic partially observed dynamic game was established. To the best of our knowledge, the general case of infinite-horizon risk-sensitive stochastic zero-sum games for both discounted as well as ergodic cost criteria was first addressed by the current authors for the differential games setup in Basu and Ghosh [4] and for the discrete-time countable state space case in Basu and Ghosh [5] . The case of nonzero-sum games in such setups still remains open. In this work, we address this novel problem and analyze the generic nonzerosum case for the discrete-time countable state space setup using totally different mathematical techniques for its solution as compared to the corresponding zero-sum case. We study this problem with two players as the analysis can be routinely extended to three or more player case without introducing any technical novelty but at the cost of further notational complication.
We use the results of Balaji and Meyn [2] to extend the work of Borkar and Meyn [13] from one-controller case to two-controller case in a fully competitive setup. In other words we study nonzero-sum risk-sensitive stochastic games on the infinite planning horizon with both discounted and ergodic cost criteria. We would like to elucidate that both Balaji and Meyn [2] as well as Borkar and Meyn [13] have obtained the desired results under a "norm-like" or "near-monotone" condition on the running cost and a Lyapunov-type stability condition. This "norm-like" condition has been crucially used in the proofs therein as to ensure that the 'relative value functions' are bounded from below. However, for our case, we have performed the analysis without this "norm-like" condition on the running cost since it would not be suitable for our purpose as it would invariably favour one of the competing players. This change makes our analysis totally novel and substantially different from those in the existing literature. Also, in most of the existing literature in this domain see, e.g., Balaji and Meyn [2] , Borkar and Meyn [13] , Cavazos-Cadena and Fernandez-Gaucherand [14] , Di Masi and Stettner [16] , and, Hernández-Hernández and Marcus [24] , the 'risk factor' is assumed to be sufficiently small. We make an assumption, for the ergodic game only, on the smallness of the cost function as in Basu and Ghosh [4] which essentially implies that the 'risk factor' cannot be too large.
Under certain assumptions, we have established the existence of Nash equilibria for both criteria. We obtain our results by studying the corresponding Bellman equations. Note that if player I announces that he is using a stationary/Markov strategy then for player II the game problem reduces to a Markov decision problem (MDP). Then by the results of Borkar and Meyn [13] , Di Masi and Stettner [15] and Hernández-Hernández and Marcus [24] , player II has optimal stationary/Markov strategies. Such a strategy of player II is called an 'optimal response' of player II corresponding to the announced strategy of player I. Optimal responses of player I to the announced strategies of player II are obtained analogously. Thus, for a given pair of strategies of the two players, there exists a set of optimal responses. This defines a point-to-set map. Any fixed point of this map is clearly a Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we establish the existence of such a fixed point thereby establishing the existence of Nash equilibria for relevant cases. For the sake of notational simplicity, we consider two-player games only. All our results extends to multi-player games in a routine manner.
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 deals with the description of the problem.
The discounted cost criterion is studied in Section 3. Section 4 deals with the ergodic cost criterion.
We conclude our paper in Section 5 with a summary and possible future directions of work.
2. Problem Description A two-person stochastic game is determined by six objects (X, U, V, r 1 , r 2 , q) where X def = {0, 1, 2, . . .} is a countable state space; U and V are action spaces of players I and II, resp., assumed to be compact metric spaces; r 1 (resp. r 2 ) : X × U × V → R is the one-stage cost function for player I (resp. II) assumed to be bounded and jointly continuous in (u, v) ∈ U × V for each k ∈ X. Let P(X) be the space of probability measures on X endowed with the Prohorov topology (see, e.g., Borkar [12] ). Let q : X × U × V → P(X) be the transition stochastic kernel which is assumed to be jointly continuous in (u, v) ∈ U × V in the topology of weak convergence for each k ∈ X. The game is played is as follows: At each stage (time instant) players observe the current state k ∈ X of the system and then players I and II independently choose actions u ∈ U , v ∈ V , resp. As a result of this, two things happen: (i) the player I (resp. II) pays an immediate cost r 1 (k, u, v)(resp. r 2 (k, u, v)),
(ii) the system moves to a new state k ′ ∈ X with distribution q(·|k, u, v). 
where
∞ are the history spaces. A strategy for player I is a sequence µ def = {µ t : H t → P(U )} t∈N of stochastic kernels. The set of all such strategies for player I is denoted by Π 1 . Given any t, T ∈ N 0 with T ≥ t + 1, the set of strategies
Definition 1. A strategy µ for player I is called a Markov strategy if 2 , M 2 , S 2 , D 2 for player II are defined analogously. The spaces M i , S i , i = 1, 2 are endowed with the product topologies derived from the Prohorov topology on the underlying spaces P(U ) (resp. P(V )) respectively. Since U, V are compact metric spaces, it follows that M i , S i , i = 1, 2 are also compact metric spaces. Note that going forward we sometimes use barbarism of notation and denote a stationary strategy {µ, µ, . . .} as {µ} or only µ when the context is clear.
Given an initial distribution π 0 ∈ P(X) and a pair of strategies (µ, ν) ∈ Π 1 ×Π 2 , the corresponding state and action processes {X t }, {U t }, {V t } are stochastic processes defined on the canonical space
is uniquely determined by µ, ν and π 0 by Ionescu Tulcea's Theorem (see, e.g., Proposition 7.28 of Bertsekas and Shreve [10] ). When π 0 = δ k , k ∈ X, we simply write
: s ≥ t) be the corresponding process starting from X (t) t = k ∈ X for given t ≥ 0. We omit the superscript when t = 0 for notational convenience. 
where θ ∈ (0, Θ], Θ > 0 is the 'risk-sensitive' parameter, α ∈ [0, 1] is the 'discount factor' and E µ,ν k,t denotes the expectation with respect to P µ,ν k,t . When t = 0, we omit this subscript 't' for notational convenience. The corresponding risk-sensitive ergodic cost for player i, i = 1, 2 is defined by
Nash equilibrium (for the cost criteria above) if
and
is said to be Nash equilibrium strategies if these measurable maps constitute a Nash equilibrium for any initial k ∈ X.
We shall first establish the existence of Nash equilibria in the class of Markov strategies for cost criterion (1) . Under additional ergodicity and smallness of cost conditions, we establish the existence of Nash equilibria in the class of stationary Markov strategies for cost criterion (2). 
t , . . .), t ≥ 0}.
Proposition 1. For a fixed initial distribution π 0 ∈ P(X), and given (µ, ν) ∈ M 1 × M 2 , the map
is jointly continuous in (µ, ν), where {X t , t ≥ 0} denotes the state process with initial law π 0 and {U t , t ≥ 0}, {V t , t ≥ 0} are the corresponding control processes. 3. Discounted Game In this section, we study the cost criterion (1) . To this end, we first consider the risk-sensitive exponential cost criterion for player I (i = 1) and II (i = 2) given by:
s : s ≥ t} is the state process and {(U
2 , consider the following Bellman equations for the exponential cost (4) for players I and II (resp.):
with a boundary condition analogous to (6) .
2 , the corresponding chain {X t } is inhomogeneous. Hence, we consider the transformed chain {X t } on X × N 0 with the transition kernelq defined bỹ
where δ s ′ ,s = 1 if s ′ = s and 0 otherwise. Now, replacing q byq and using the arguments used in the proof of Proposition 3.1 of Di Masi and Stettner [15] , we get the following result. We omit the routine details. (5) and (7) (resp.) satisfying the boundary condition (6) such that
Thus, µ *
is an optimal response of player I (resp. player II) corresponding to ν ∈ Π t,∞ 2 (resp. µ ∈ Π t,∞ 1 ). Hence, without loss of generality, we can effectively consider the strategy pair (µ, ν) ∈ M 1 × M 2 for further analysis of this game. (13) and (14) (resp.), we now define the following point-to-set maps H i : M j → 2 M i , i, j = 1, 2, i = j as follows:
Considering the minimizing selectors (μ[ν],ν[µ]) in
We now prove the existence of Nash equilibria in the class of Markov strategies for the exponential cost criterion (4).
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Proof: Given θ ∈ (0, Θ], (µ, ν) ∈ M 1 × M 2 , both H 1 (ν) and H 2 (µ) are non-empty and convex implying H(µ, ν) is also non-empty and convex. Let {({µ *
satisfy (13) and (14) resp., it follows (by linearity) that so do µ t,∞ [ν] and ν t,∞ [µ] resp. implying that they satisfy (11) and (12) resp. The closure property of H(µ, ν) thus follows. Hence, H is a map with non-empty, closed and convex values. Now, by Proposition 1, L µ,ν {X t , t ≥ 0} is jointly continuous
as obtained in (9) has a minimizing Markov strategy (11) andφ 2 [µ] as obtained in (10) has a minimizing Markov strategy (12), i.e., the minimizations in (9) and (10) can be effectively considered over M 1 and M 2 (resp.) which are compact sets. Also, 
Hence the map H is upper semi-continuous. Then, by Theorem 1 of Fan [19] , there exists a fixed point (µ * , ν
whereμ[ν * ] (resp.ν[µ * ]) is any minimizing selector in (13) (resp. (14)). Then (µ * , ν
is a Nash equilibrium strategy for the cost criterion (4), i.e.,
✷
Now we prove the existence of Nash equilibria in the class of Markov strategies for the cost criterion (1).
Given definition (4), the Bellman equations for the discounted cost (1) are:
for player 1 with the boundary condition
and e θψ 2 (θ,(k,t)) = inf
for player 2 with the boundary condition
Theorem 2. Given θ ∈ (0, Θ], consider the fixed point Markov strategies (µ * , ν * ) of H as in (18) in Theorem 1. Then (µ * , ν * ) is also a pair of Nash equilibrium strategy for the cost criterion
(1), i.e.,ψ
are unique bounded solutions to (19) and (21) (resp.) satisfying the boundary conditions (20) and (22) respectively.
Proof:
The result follows directly from (4), Proposition 2, Theorem 1 and the fact that log is an increasing function. ✷
Ergodic Game
In this section, we study the cost criterion (2) . To this end, we make the following assumption:
(A1) The process {X t } t∈N 0 is an irreducible, aperiodic Markov chain under any pair of stationary Markov strategies (µ, ν) ∈ S 1 × S 2 .
We also assume the following condition which guarantees uniform ergodicity of controlled Markov processes and is used to study additive average cost problems (see, e.g., Hernández-Lerma [25] , Section 3.3 or an equivalent assumption (A1) in Di Masi and Stettner [15] or (3.2) in Hernández-Hernández and Marcus [24] ):
(A2) There exists a number 0 < δ < 1 such that for all i, j ∈ X, u, u
where || · || TV denotes the total variation norm (see, e.g., Hernández-Lerma [25] , Appendix B).
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In our further analysis of this problem, the above assumptions always hold.
Under (A1)-(A2), it follows from the Lemma 3.3 of Hernández-Lerma [25] that for any (µ, ν) ∈ S 1 × S 2 , the corresponding Markov chain {X t } is uniformly ergodic with a unique invariant probability measure η[µ, ν] ∈ P(X), i.e.,
whereq t (·|k, µ, ν) denotes the t-step transition kernel under (µ, ν) starting from k ∈ X.
Remark 1.
It is important to note here that the quantity δ on the r.h.s. of the above inequality (23) is independent of the strategy pair (µ, ν) and (23) holds uniformly across all (µ, ν) ∈ S 1 ×S 2 (see also condition C4 of Theorem 4(ii) in Federgruen et. al. [20] ). Note that an assumption equivalent to (A2) was also necessary for the corresponding zero-sum case as analyzed in Basu and Ghosh [5] . Equivalent assumptions are quite common in the corresponding literature for the one-controller case (see, e.g., Di Masi and Stettner [15] , [16] and [17] , Hernández-Hernández and Marcus [24] ).
Definition 4. For any B ⊆ X, define the hitting time of the set B by {X t } as
Denote τ B = τ j if B = {j}. Similarly, define the first return time to B by {X t } as
Denote σ B = σ j if B = {j}. (a) For every A ∈ 2 X , the chain {X t } is geometrically recurrent uniformly over all (µ, ν) ∈ S 1 × S 2 , i.e., there exists some
In particular, if A = {j}, j ∈ X we write the constants above as R j and B j respectively. Note that
In particular, if A = {j}, j ∈ X we write the constant above as L j .
(c) There exist η < 1, b < ∞, a finite subset C ⊂ X and a bounded function V :
where η, b, C and V are all independent of (µ, ν) ∈ S 1 × S 2 .
Remark 2. Note that stochastic Lyapunov-type stability assumptions as in Proposition 3(c)
was also necessary for the corresponding zero-sum stochastic differential game case as analyzed in Basu and Ghosh [4] . See also Remark 1 for reference to the corresponding literature where equivalent assumptions are used. We also refer the reader to Altman et. al. [1] for examples of such games on countable spaces with additive cost criteria where equivalent stability assumptions were made.
Henceforth we fix θ ∈ (0, Θ]. Given strategies (µ, ν) ∈ Π 1 × Π 2 , consider the following dynamic programming (HJB) equations for the ergodic cost (2) for players I and II (resp.):
where λ 1 , λ 2 are scalars. 
and similarly, there exists at most one boundedV 2 [µ] (modulo an additive constant) and a uniquê (27) such that
Hence there exist measurable (minimizing) selectors (see Beneš [9] )
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Hence, by Proposition 1.1 of Di Masi and Stettner [15] (see also Theorem 2.1 of Hernández-Hernández and Marcus [24] ), given (µ, ν) ∈ Π 1 × Π 2 , if there exist bounded solutions to (26) and (27) then the minimizing selectorμ[ν] andν [µ] in (30) and (31) resp. generates stationary (see (28) and (29)) optimal response strategy of player I (resp. player II) when the other's strategy fixed.
Hence, without loss of generality, we can effectively consider the strategy pairs (µ, ν) ∈ S 1 × S 2 for further analysis of this game. Thus if we consider the minimizing selectorsμ[ν] andν [µ] in (30) and (31) respectively, we can define the following point-to-set maps
as follows:
A priori, it is not clear that the sets H 1 , H 2 and hence H are nonempty. We now proceed to prove the existence of unique bounded solutions to (26) and (27) . Once this result is established, the nonemptyness of the above sets follow automatically. Then, using arguments similar to Theorem 1, we prove the existence of Nash equilibria by showing that the map H has a fixed point (μ,ν). To this end, we make the following definitions (see Balaji and Meyn [2] and Borkar and Meyn [13] ).
Definition 5. Given an arbitrarily fixed state 0 ∈ X and any strategy (µ, ν) ∈ S 1 × S 2 , let
Also define
where w * 1 [ν] is any minimizer in (39). Similarly, let
where w * 2 [µ] is any minimizer in (42). Note that since θ is fixed we have suppressed the explicit dependence on θ in these definitions for notational convenience. A priori, it is not obvious that the quantities defined above are finite.
The following Proposition 4 and Lemmata 1 and 2 settle this issue.
First, we make a "small cost" assumption which shall hold for the rest of this paper.
where R 0 > 1 is as in part (a) of Proposition 3.
Remark 3. Note that a similar assumption was also necessary for the corresponding zero-sum stochastic differential game case as analyzed in Basu and Ghosh [4] . Now we state and prove the following important proposition. 
Moreover, Λ *
is continuous in ν (resp. µ).
Proof: We prove it for player I. The result for player II follows analogously. From (35) we obtain, by Jensen's inequality
which implies
Hence we have
The inequality (43) follows by taking the inf over µ ∈ S 1 . We now prove the joint continuity in
denote the chain starting at 0. By Proposition 1,
Then, by Skorohod's Theorem (see Theorem 2.2.2 of Borkar [12] ), there exists some augmentation
where {X
t , t ≥ 0}, n = 1, 2, . . . , ∞ denotes the Markov chain under (µ (n) , ν (n) ) on this augmented space starting at 0. Following (25) , let σ
Then, obviouslyP -a.s. Hence we get the joint continuity under (µ, ν) of σ 0 . Hence, for any 0 < ǫ ≤ ||r 1 || ∞ and along
, we have by (45) and the joint continuity of σ 0 under (µ, ν)
where |Λ| ≤ ||r 1 || ∞ and U
are the corresponding control sequences under (µ (n) , ν (n) ), n = 1, 2, . . . , ∞ on this augmented space. Then
Moreover, by (A3) and part (a) of Proposition 3, we have
which, in particular, implies that {σ
} are uniformly integrable. Given any ε > 0 it follows from (48) that there exists some large enough constant
implying {g n k } are uniformly integrable.
It follows by Theorem 6.18(iii) of Klenke [29] and (47) that {f n k } is uniformly integrable.
Also, by (A3) and part (a) of Proposition 3, we havẽ
Hence, by Corollary 1.3.1 of Borkar [12] , we get lim
Similarly we can show that
Proof: We prove it for player I when player II uses ν ∈ S 2 . The other case is analogous. For each
= h * while for k = 0, we have
where the inequality follows from (35) . It follows that (55) 
Since it is non-empty as 0 ∈ S and the chain {X t } is irreducible under the stationary strategy (w * 1 [ν], ν) by assumption (A1), we get by Proposition 4.2.3 of Meyn and Tweedie [31] that it is full, i.e. S = X establishing part 2. ✷ Note that, under the additional assumption (A3), we can actually show a tighter result than part 2 of Lemma 1 as given below.
Lemma 2. Under (A1) -(A3) and for any (µ, ν) ∈ S 1 × S 2 ,
Moreover, h *
Proof: We prove it for h * 1 [ν]. The proof is exactly similar for h * 2 [µ] . Under the assumptions of this lemma, we have by (38) and part (a) of Proposition 3
where the equality follows from Proposition 3.4.5(ii) of Meyn and Tweedie [31] . Hence we get
Letμ[ν] ∈ S 1 be any minimizer in (38). Such a minimizer always exists by (59), Proposition 1 and the compactness of S 1 . Hence, for all k = 0, we have using Jensen's inequality and part (a) of
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under (µ, ν) can be proved as in the proof of Proposition 4. Hence the continuity of h * 1 [ν] in ν follows from (59) and the compactness of S 1 . ✷ Now we state and prove following theorem which is a key step for proving the existence of Nash equilibria.
is defined in (39), is the unique solution in B(X)×R + to (26) . Similarly, (ln h *
is defined in (42), is the unique solution to (27) again in B(X) × R + .
Proof: We shall prove this for player I when player II plays the strategy ν. The other case is proved analogously. We first prove that (ln h *
is a solution to (26) . By Lemma 1, h *
under the stationary strategy w * 1 [ν] . Note that, for k = 0, we can get as in (60) of Lemma 2,
It follows from the Markov property that 
Using the minimizing selectorsμ[ν] andν[µ] in (75) and (77) as our optimal responses for given (µ, ν) ∈ S 1 × S 2 , we now prove the existence of Nash equilibria in the class of stationary Markov strategies for the ergodic cost criterion (2).
Theorem 4. Given θ ∈ (0, Θ], there exists a pair of Nash equilibrium strategy in S 1 × S 2 for the game corresponding to the cost criterion (2).
